【美国商务部发布90天延期许可，第三次“豁免”华为】美国商务部当日发布公告，宣布发布90天延期许可 ，允许美国企业继续与中国华为技术有限公司进行业务往来。路透社称，这是美国政府自今年5月把华为列入管制黑名单以来，第三次宣布“豁免”华为。NPR称，在美国乡村地区，许多电信运营商购买华为设备，特朗普政府第三次“豁免”华为意味着这些企业可以继续采购华为公司产品。美国商务部长罗斯在声明中说，“延期许可将允许电信运营商在一些美国最偏远乡村地区提供服务，否则，这些地区可能会陷入一片黑暗”。此前路透社曾报道说，特朗普政府只准备给予华为两周的许可延期，但据知情人士称，这一计划在上周末发生了改变 ，而特朗普政府正在研究更长时间的延期，只是由于监管措施还未最终敲定。而华为董事长梁华18日对美国CNBC表示，不管美国会不会延长豁免令，对华为的影响都“非常有限”。https://t.cn/Aidc2mcH
是不是都开始降温了啊，杭州最近几天也太冷了吧
现在都已经是冬学期的第二周了，时间过得好快呀，研究生的1/16结束
今天第一次喝麦思威热的拿铁☕️，好幸福啊～
天气冷了之后我又好想买个床上用的小桌子啊，这样晚上都可以坐在被窝里面看电脑了
双11买了一个新杯子，终于有了喝咖啡的新杯子；新杯子是小猫的图案，粉粉的特别可爱！
天气☁️冷了的小在评论里面哦（我真的好怕被pb）
现在都已经是冬学期的第二周了，时间过得好快呀，研究生的1/16结束
今天第一次喝麦思威热的拿铁☕️，好幸福啊～
天气冷了之后我又好想买个床上用的小桌子啊，这样晚上都可以坐在被窝里面看电脑了
双11买了一个新杯子，终于有了喝咖啡的新杯子；新杯子是小猫的图案，粉粉的特别可爱！
天气☁️冷了的小在评论里面哦（我真的好怕被pb）
#海大学术# 上海海事大学滴水湖经济与管理论坛系列讲座：Heaven is High and the Emperor is Far Away: Information Asymmetry and Organizational Implementation of State Policies
演讲题目：Heaven is High and the Emperor is Far Away: Information Asymmetry and Organizational Implementation of State Policies
演讲人：周小宇
演讲时间：https://t.cn/Aidt4nKx
演讲人介绍：周小宇博士毕业于北京大学光华管理学院，现任上海科技大学创业管理学院任助理教授、研究员。他的研究兴趣集中于受众评估（audience evaluation）、组织类别（organizational category）和企业社会责任战略。他的研究成果发表在Academy of Management Journal，World Development， Journal of Business Ethics等国际权威学术期刊上。他关于中国企业创新行为和利益相关者战略的研究论文分别发表在《南开管理评论》，《管理科学》，以及《营销科学学报》等中文管理核心期刊上。
讲座摘要： In this study, we develop a theory of how information asymmetry undermines state government’s capacity to influence organizations’ behaviors. The availability of local information is a key for the state government to monitor organizational implementation of national policies. When the distance to the state government is farther, organizations are more likely to escape from the state’s monitoring, and this distance-(un)implementation link is more pronounced with higher costs of gathering local information. We test our theory in the context of Chinese publicly listed firms’ environmental activities between 2008 and 2014 when the state government issued a series of policies on environmental protection in its 12th and 13th Five-Year Plans. Our results show that firms are less likely to respond to the demands of state government on environmental protection when they are located in regions that are geographically distant to China’s capital city Beijing, as there’s more information asymmetry between the state government and the regions. This distance effect is attenuated in regions with better road transportation, more Weibo postings on environmental protection, and foreign consulates, as these factors either ease the communication between the state government and local community, or constitute alternative sources for state leaders to acquire local information. Our study contributes to the Weberian state literature and the research on state capacity, and it provides an information-based explanation for corporate environmentalism in a major transitional economy.
演讲题目：Heaven is High and the Emperor is Far Away: Information Asymmetry and Organizational Implementation of State Policies
演讲人：周小宇
演讲时间：https://t.cn/Aidt4nKx
演讲人介绍：周小宇博士毕业于北京大学光华管理学院，现任上海科技大学创业管理学院任助理教授、研究员。他的研究兴趣集中于受众评估（audience evaluation）、组织类别（organizational category）和企业社会责任战略。他的研究成果发表在Academy of Management Journal，World Development， Journal of Business Ethics等国际权威学术期刊上。他关于中国企业创新行为和利益相关者战略的研究论文分别发表在《南开管理评论》，《管理科学》，以及《营销科学学报》等中文管理核心期刊上。
讲座摘要： In this study, we develop a theory of how information asymmetry undermines state government’s capacity to influence organizations’ behaviors. The availability of local information is a key for the state government to monitor organizational implementation of national policies. When the distance to the state government is farther, organizations are more likely to escape from the state’s monitoring, and this distance-(un)implementation link is more pronounced with higher costs of gathering local information. We test our theory in the context of Chinese publicly listed firms’ environmental activities between 2008 and 2014 when the state government issued a series of policies on environmental protection in its 12th and 13th Five-Year Plans. Our results show that firms are less likely to respond to the demands of state government on environmental protection when they are located in regions that are geographically distant to China’s capital city Beijing, as there’s more information asymmetry between the state government and the regions. This distance effect is attenuated in regions with better road transportation, more Weibo postings on environmental protection, and foreign consulates, as these factors either ease the communication between the state government and local community, or constitute alternative sources for state leaders to acquire local information. Our study contributes to the Weberian state literature and the research on state capacity, and it provides an information-based explanation for corporate environmentalism in a major transitional economy.
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